From the President’s Notebook

By Humbert J. Polito, Jr.

“Lead by Example”

As a law student at the University of Connecticut, I had the pleasure of taking a course in Trial Practice from a New London lawyer named Dale Faulkner — a trial lawyer and a member of CTLA. His infectious enthusiasm helped show me that I wanted to be a trial lawyer. He led by example.

Over ten years ago, Dale asked me to take over that course at UConn Law School that I continue to teach. I was honored by that request — especially knowing that dozens of trial lawyers within CTLA could serve as more experienced instructors than I.

Ten years later, I now have the honor of serving as President of CTLA. Those of us who teach — and there are many within the Bar — know both the genuine enthusiasm and worries of current law students and young trial lawyers. Our profession is experiencing extraordinary challenges.

For example, some interest groups and international corporations want to attack us by harming our clients: outlawing rights and instituting caps on damages. Now more than ever trial lawyers need to be vigilant in the legislative arena to protect patient and consumer rights.

As a profession, trial lawyers face tremendous skepticism and need guidance and solid research. Trial lawyers need to know how to show skeptical jurors why it is right to side with the plaintiff when the evidence supports the plaintiff — and CTLA seminars continue to offer excellent research and continuing legal education to provide new and experienced trial lawyers with the tools to do just that.

Trial lawyers live in extraordinarily difficult economic times. We all have friends, relatives, neighbors and clients who have lost jobs, suffered reductions in pay and savings and who fear that the next job lost may be their own. Many of us in this profession who have experienced success have chosen to give back in various ways and it is upon that sense of public service that CTLA was built. I am gratified when past CTLA Presidents attend and continue to share their wisdom and experience at Board and Committee Meetings. CTLA needs that historical perspective in order to know where we have been and to decide where we are going as an organization and a profession.

We cannot forget that at its heart CTLA is a volunteer organization — with busy trial lawyers stepping up and out of their offices to promote the goals and values of civil justice for all and not just for a few. We can never forget that this organization... (Continued on page 2)

An Act Concerning Timely Medical Treatment for Injured Workers: A CTLA Proposal

By Frank A. Bailey, Tremont & Sheldon, Bridgeport

This year, the CTLA Worker’s Compensation Section again is proposing legislation to eliminate delays in the authorization of medical treatment in accepted worker’s compensation claims.

First, our proposal places specific requirements on employers who choose to object to a claimant’s recommended medical treatment because they believed it is unreasonable or unnecessary. It would require respondents to file a Form 36 and request permission from a commissioner before discontinuing medical treatment just as respondents must do when they seek to discontinue indemnity benefits. The bill requires respondents to support their denial with competent medical evidence and/or provide a legal basis for the discontinuance.

Second, our proposal codifies Memorandum No. 98-08, regarding authorization for treatment. This Memorandum states that once a physician is authorized to treat an injured worker, pre-certification for each visit and/or procedure is not required. Despite this Memorandum, medical providers routinely seek pre-authorization to treat.... (Continued on page 3)
We can all take a lesson from those before us who sacrificed and reached out to others in need. One of my clearest childhood memories was watching my parents around a dining room table pondering bills and their checkbook and wonder how they were going to support our family of twelve children. They found a way and still reached out to others who needed help much more than my parents did.

Most importantly, CTLA needs to be reminded that competent lawyers who do good work are the best vehicles to attract new members. Good lawyers, like good judges and teachers, lead by example. Quality of character and of love of one’s work are infectious qualities. CTLA’s ranks include many such trial lawyers who continue to lead by example.

To that end, along with President-Elect David Cooney, I am designating CTLA members throughout the State to identify and organize service projects during the next year around which groups of local CTLA members can rally — to contribute primarily their time and, if appropriate, their financial support. Why? Because community service has and will continue to replenish and diversify our Board, our Committees, our membership and our leadership with people who are willing to see beyond their own survival and help others.

Tough times have a crystallizing effect and serve to remind us who and what is truly important within one’s personal and professional life.

In recent years, CTLA has experienced its own financial realities and challenges. As an organization, CTLA must learn to live within its means and continue to make a thorough assessment of its financial picture. I will continue the work of recent Presidents to develop a strategic budget that is practical and realistic and helps to insure the long term strength of CTLA.

We can all take a lesson from those before us who sacrificed and reached out to others in need. One of my clearest childhood memories was watching my parents around a dining room table pondering bills and their checkbook and wonder how they were going to support our family of twelve children. They found a way and still reached out to others who needed help much more than my parents did.
should always be part of the fabric of what we do at CTLA. When we reach out to others in need we are leading by example and often receive more than we imagine in return.

In addition to service efforts, we will carry forward specific initiatives of recent years. CTLA’s updated website offers better information, discussion boards and more comprehensive services to members. Legislative proposals have been solicited from all members and were vetted at our recent Legislative Retreat so that our efforts at the Capitol can benefit as many members as possible. At the time of this writing, we are hopeful that this session’s legislative efforts will bear fruit for as many members and clients as possible.

The use of web and teleseminars on key topics will enhance our ability to help our members represent our clients effectively. We will also continue to make the nomination process to the CTLA Board more transparent so that any trial lawyer with an interest knows how the leaders of CTLA are nominated and chosen.

As a parent of three teenage sons, I know that my children watch what I do much more closely than what I say. In these difficult times that lesson applies to our work as trial lawyers more than ever. We all know that criticisms of some trial lawyers have been justified. But I also know that the bulk of our membership quietly and regularly carries out selfless good acts within our communities — volunteering, tutoring, teaching, coaching, pro bono efforts, to name just a few. We can and will continue to change the hearts and minds of others about trial lawyers by doing good works. As David Ball, the noted trial consultant, stated recently: “there is no effective weapon against the power of good works.”

The backbone of CTLA is a hardworking staff guided by lawyers who exhibit genuine enthusiasm for the practice of law and willingness to serve others. More than ever, we need to see the best in ourselves and in our colleagues — that our word is our bond, that people are more valuable than profits and that we do good by doing good works. We need to lead by example.

As a teenager, my father embarrassed me more than once by giving me a hug and kiss and nagging me to “remember you are a Polito.” The heart of his message — to never stray from one’s core values and priorities — has grown more precious to me over time. It is a message I carry with me as I serve this year as President of CTLA.

An Act Concerning Timely Medical Treatment for Injured Workers: A CTLA Proposal (Continued from page 1)

Third, the bill gives commissioners limited authority to authorize routine and non-invasive treatment at informal hearings. Commissioners are already empowered to authorize a change of treating physician with or without a hearing; this proposal simply adds a practical aspect to that authority. In other words, inherent in the power to authorize a change of treater, it the power to authorize that treater’s recommendations.

CTLA hopes to raise this bill in the upcoming Legislative Session. To demonstrate the need for this vital legislation, the Workers’ Compensation Section is collecting data on the number of workers whose medical treatment has been delayed or denied. If you know of any such claimants, please submit the following form to either Neil Ferstand at the CTLA offices or to Section Chairman Frank Costello, McCarthy, Schuman & Coombs, 61 Russ Street, Hartford, CT 06106.

MEDICAL TREATMENT DELAYED INJURED WORKER INFORMATION SHEET

Name: __________________________________________________________

Address: ________________________________________________________

Telephone #: Home: _______ Cell: _______

E-mail: ___________________________ Date of Birth: _________________

Marital status (circle) Married  Single  Divorced  Widowed  Number of Children: __________

Date of Injury: _______________________

Is this claim accepted (circle) Yes  No

Has VA been approved (circle) Yes  No

Employer at time of injury: ________________________________

Workers’ Comp. Insurance Carrier: _______________________________

Injuries: _______________________________________________________

Describe the delay in medical treatment: ________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

______________________________________________________________

Is your client willing to testify to the legislature: (circle) Yes  No

Is your client willing to submit a signed statement to the legislature: (circle) Yes  No
What I Saw in China

A few weeks ago I was asked to go to China as part of a small delegation to advise the Chinese government on their draft tort code. Now that’s remarkable on several counts. First of all, who knew the Chinese were drafting a tort code? Didn’t everyone just do what the local party leader told them to do? And, why were they just getting around to a tort law now, after 4,000 years? And, why did they care what people in the U.S. think; Isn’t our tort law the subject of ridicule worldwide? And, finally, why — why in the world — were they interested in what I in particular had to say?

Well, it turns out that the Chinese are very serious indeed about drafting a tort law. In fact, they’re systematically creating a whole legal code, to replace a hodgepodge that grew up under Mao and his successors: they’ve done domestic relations, property and civil procedure, and they had completed the third draft of the tort code and wanted our input on some very specific questions before submitting the fourth and final draft to the National Peoples’ Congress for enactment.

And to the question, why me? the answer is that the Chinese have relied heavily on Connecticut’s own Yale China Law Center for consultation of all kinds. The Center is a remarkable institution, the brainchild of Yale Law Prof. Paul Gewirtz (full disclosure: my pal), who now knows everyone in the Chinese legal establishment, as well as most of the legally-focused dissidents, and seems to be China’s go-to person for advice on legal reform. They wanted a scholar, a judge and a practicing lawyer, so they got Ben Liebman from Columbia, the only U.S. law professor whose two areas of specialization are tort law and Chinese any law; New Haven Judge Jonathan Silbert, who has of course mediated or decided many thousands of tort cases; and me, a real lawyer as well as the proud editor of the CTLA Forum.

To give you a flavor of what the Chinese were doing, they had a short list of very specific questions for us Americans. One in particular was, “what is the appropriate measure of damages for wrongful death?” Good question. I told them that they had to find their solution to the same problem that confronts any legal system: in a wrongful death case, the tortfeasor has done the worst harm there is, but the direct victim cannot be compensated. And wrongful death cases all therefore have three, not two sides: tortfeasor, victim, and recipient of the award.

So what seems fair to the Chinese? Apparently, China has been using a system under which compensation is based on national average earnings — but with a twist: people registered as rural residents get the rural rate; urban residents get the much higher urban rate. Nobody likes this system; for one thing, a huge number of registered rural residents actually live in the cities. There has been talk of paying everyone the same, but that didn’t sit well either. One professor at the conference gave an example: suppose two people are killed in the same car, a business executive and his driver. The executive’s family may have a much larger mortgage to pay (China has its own kind of communism). Shouldn’t they be paid differently? And yet, aren’t all lives equally valuable? Exactly the same sort of problem we wrestle with in every case.

The Chinese official in charge of the drafting process offered his own plan. Different earning histories, he said, should result in different compensation. But, he continued, for emotional damages there should be no distinctions — each life should be treated as equally valuable, each death as an equal loss.

Not a bad solution, I thought. As it happens, it’s the same one that Kenneth Feinberg arrived at as the special master for the 9/11 victims’ fund.

So the Chinese are really trying. We didn’t see more than glimpses of the other side of the story — the absence of free elections, the restrictions on free expression, the ways in which political power is mobilized for private gain. But what we did see was striking. China is very deliberately setting up a functioning legal system. The way they see it, they are a developing nation, and just as they want to have more factories, more trade, and more prosperity, they want to have more law. And the United States legal system — our much-despised tort system very much included — is their most important model. Another reason for us to be proud of what we do.
**Update on Evidence 2009**

By Bob Adelman and Neil Sutton

“Facts are stubborn things and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”


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Introduction

This Update covers civil cases and, to the extent useful in civil cases, criminal cases, published from November 11, 2008 through September 8, 2009.

The Update is organized to follow the format of the Connecticut Code of Evidence ("CCE.")). That is, to the extent possible, the cases are dealt with under the headings assigned to the ten articles in the CCE.

However, as stated in the commentary to CCE §1-2 (b): "Although the Code will address most evidentiary matters, it cannot possible address every evidentiary issue that might arise during trial." In addition, the authors have included a few cases dealing not with evidence, but with trial practice and procedure, which may be of use to trial lawyers. Therefore, in addition to the articles outlined in the Code, the Table of Contents contains six additional headings: Expert Disclosures, Final Argument, Sufficiency of Evidence, Jury Selection, Juror Misconduct and Hearing in Damages.

IV. Relevancy

§ 4-1 EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE TO EXPLAIN AMBIGUITY IN AGREEMENT — ISHAM V. ISHAM, 292 Conn. 170 (2009); Katz, J.; Trial Judge — H. arrigan, J.

RULE: Where an agreement is susceptible of more than one interpretation, evidence regarding the parties' intent is admissible.

FACTS: The parties' separation agreement provided that the defendant would initially pay $150,000 per year in alimony with an automatic adjustment based on fluctuations in the defendant's "salary."

At the time of the dissolution, the defendant received an annual salary of $500,000 and no bonuses. His compensation package was later changed to include bonuses and stock options. His 1997 W-2 reflected total compensation of $1.3 million, of which defendant claimed only $646,000 was salary. By 2003, his W-2 indicated total compensation of $6.58 million, of which defendant claimed only $900,000 was salary. While the defendant increased his alimony payments, he did so based upon the "salary" alone.

Plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, claiming that "salary", as used in the separation agreement, was intended by the parties to include bonus compensation.

The trial court held that "salary" was clear and unambiguous, and did not include bonuses, and therefore refused to allow testimony as to the intended meaning of "salary."

The Supreme Court reversed.

REASONING:

At the court hearing at which the parties' marriage was dissolved, the separation agreement was put on the record orally. During that recitation, plaintiff's counsel referred interchangeably to the defendant's "salary" and his "income". The written agreement did not define the term "salary." The Court ordered that the transcript of the hearing be placed in the file and be treated as the separation agreement.

In light of counsel's interchangeable use of the terms "salary" and "income", the Supreme Court held that both interpretations of the term salary, with or without bonuses, were plausible. Therefore, the Court held, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent should have been admitted.

§ 4-3 POST ACCIDENT TRANSFER OF HOME — STATE V. COCCOMO, 115 Conn. App. 384 (2009); Bishop, J.; Trial Judge — Devlin, J.

RULE: Evidence that defendant transferred ownership of her home ten days after a collision is admissible in a criminal case, where its probative value is outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect. (This type of evidence is admissible in a civil case.)

FACTS: The defendant, a second grade school teacher, attended a work-related dinner at which sangria was served. Defendant testified she drank between one and two glasses of sangria. As she was driving home, she came around a curve, crossed three feet over the center line, and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing its three occupants.

Defendant's blood was drawn in the ambulance on the way to the hospital. Her blood alcohol was reported as 0.241. However, there was substantial evidence to support the defendant's claim that there had been a mix-up of blood samples, and that the blood which revealed this blood alcohol content was not hers. In addition, there was uncontradicted evidence that her actions at the scene and afterwards were inconsistent with someone whose blood alcohol content was 0.241 — she did not appear "sloppy drunk."

The State offered three documents as evidence of consciousness of guilt: (1) an excerpt from defendant's medical records documenting that she received a printout of her blood alcohol content result three days after the collision; (2) a certified copy of a quitclaim deed showing that 10 days after the collision the defendant transferred ownership of her house to her mother for one dollar; and (3) a certified copy of a City of Stamford tax card showing that the house an appraised value of more than $500,000. The trial court admitted the documents. The defendant was convicted.

The Appellate Court reversed.

REASONING:

The trial court had relied on Batick v. Seymour, 186 Conn. 632 (1982), where the Supreme Court held that in a civil case evidence of such a transfer of property was admissible against the defendant. However, the Appellate Court held that, in a criminal case, the unfair prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighs its probative value.
"The evidence admitted was likely to lead the jury to believe that the defendant transferred her property in an attempt to evade any responsibility she may have had in the accident. Because there were three fatalities resulting from the collision in this case, evidence of such an effort by the defendant to protect her assets was likely to inflame the jury and distract it from the issues at hand. On this basis, we conclude that the consciousness of guilt evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and, therefore, was admitted improperly."

115 Conn. App. At 401.

**COMMENT:** Although each case turns on its specific facts, this type of evidence is generally admissible in a civil case.

§ 4-3 Probative Value of Medical Pamphlet Offered on Credibility Outweighed by Prejudicial Effect — Costanzo v. Gray, 112 Conn. App. 614, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 905 (2009); Beach, J.; Trial Judge — Shaban, J.

**RULE:** The probative value of a pamphlet issued by a medical equipment manufacturer, which describes a procedure at variance with the procedure used by the defendant physician, is outweighed by its unfair prejudicial effect when offered only on credibility.

**FACTS:** Plaintiff went to Dr. F. Scott Gray with lower back pain. An MRI revealed a left herniated lumbar disc. Gray recommended surgery. The plaintiff signed a consent form authorizing a "left L4-L5 microdiscectomy" using the METRx retractor.

In a pre-surgical medical history form Gray submitted to Danbury Hospital, he described the plaintiff’s chief complaint as “right leg discomfort with a large right-sided L4-L5 disc herniation by MRI scan.”

Gray operated on the right side of the plaintiff's disc. In his operative report, Gray's pre-op and post-op diagnosis was “right-sided herniated disc L4-L5.”

Following a post-op office visit, Gray wrote that he had operated on the right side of the patient's back “because so many of his symptoms were on the right side...”

The surgery did not relieve the plaintiff's symptoms, and he required an additional surgery. Plaintiff sued Gray, claiming he negligently operated on the wrong side of the disc and failed to obtain informed consent to the surgery.

At trial, Gray admitted that the plaintiff had never had any right-sided symptoms, and conceded that the MRI showed the herniation to be on the left side. However, Gray claimed that he did not operate on the wrong side, and testified that he removed material from the right side to create space for the bulge on the left to sink back into place.

Gray's expert testified that, although Gray operated on the right side, this was a left microdiscectomy with “a contralateral approach.”

Gray had performed the surgery using a METRx retractor system, which allows the surgeon to access the disc by splitting muscles instead of peeling them back layer by layer.

The manufacturer of the METRx system, Medtronic, had issued a pamphlet which included diagrams depicting how the system works. The diagrams showed that when one operated on a left-sided herniated disc, one operated on the left side of the disc. The pamphlet did not show or mention the “contralateral approach” described by Gray and his expert.

Plaintiff's counsel attempted to introduce the pamphlet during the cross-examination of Dr. Gray. Gray testified that “most of the time” he did not give the METRx pamphlet to his patients, and that there were no useful documents available to help him describe the METRx procedure to his patients.

Plaintiff sought to cross examine Gray on whether he had given the pamphlet to another patient, claiming that this impeached Gray's testimony that “most of the time” he did not use the pamphlet with his patients, and that he did not think there was a useful pamphlet from the manufacturer to give to patients.

Defendant objected, because the other patient had a pending lawsuit against Gray, so the examination would lead to unfairly prejudicial questions about the other lawsuit.

**REASONING:**

“The court acted within its discretion to balance the use of the pamphlet for credibility purposes against the concern that the diagram in the pamphlet would be unduly prejudicial and subject to misuse by the jury.” 112 Conn. App. at 620-21.

**COMMENT:** The danger of unfair prejudice would have been greatly reduced by offering the pamphlet through plaintiff's own expert, pursuant to CCE §8-3(8), as evidence of the standard of care.

VII. Opinions and Expert Testimony


**RULE:** In an inadequate security case against a railroad involving one of its stations, plaintiff is not required to produce an expert with "railroad expertise."

**FACTS:** James Sullivan was barhopping when he encountered Larone Hines and a group of men outside a nightclub. After the encounter became hostile, the group of men chased Sullivan up a stairway leading to a Metro-North train station platform where Hines shot and killed Sullivan.

Sullivan's estate sued Metro-North, claiming that his death was a result of inadequate security at the station.

Plaintiff disclosed a premises security expert, a former police officer with a substantial premises security background, but no specific experience, training or knowledge in security at railroad stations.

The defendant filed a motion to preclude his testimony on the ground that the expert was not qualified to render an opinion on security at a railroad station. The motion was granted by the trial court. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.
The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court.

REASONING:
The trial court precluded the testimony principally because of the expert’s lack of experience with railroad station security. The Supreme Court held that this was too narrow a focus:

“Resolution of the issue before us turns on whether the issue before the jury involved premises security generally or railroad security in particular. The plaintiff’s decedent first encountered Hines and his companions on Monroe Street, a public street not far from the railroad station. Hines and the men followed the decedent as he ran to the stairway underneath the railroad trestle. There was a physical altercation on the stairway and Hines then shot the decedent on those stairs, which led up to the railroad platform. On these facts, we conclude that the jury was called upon to decide an issue of premises security in general. We see no distinction between security on a stairway that happens to lead to a railroad platform and security on any other public stairway in a high crime area. The stairwell in which the attack against the decedent occurred is open to and accessible by the public at all times. Although it provides access to the railroad platform, there is nothing about this stairway that is unique to railroads. The stairs simply connect the building and platforms to sidewalks and streets in the immediate vicinity of the railroad station. The fact that the stairway leads to a railroad platform is incidental to the issue of security in that stairwell. The matter at issue here had nothing to do with safety specific to railroads, such as boarding or deboarding a train or installation of safety signals along the tracks. See, e.g. Maguire v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., United States District Court, Docket No.99 C 3240, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5226, *16 (N.D. Ill. March 28, 2002) (safety measures regarding boarding train are specific to railroad for purpose of admissibility of expert testimony). In other words, the negligence alleged by the plaintiff is not specific to railroad stations.”

292 Conn. at 159-160.

SUPERSEDING CAUSE:
This case also considers another issue of critical interest to plaintiff’s lawyers: whether or not the doctrine of superseding cause survived Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 263 Conn. 424 (2003). The answer is that the doctrine still applies in three situations: (1) an unforeseeable intentional tort; (2) a force of nature; or (3) a criminal act.

Fortunately, Justice Katz’s concurring opinion specifically instructs the trial court to instruct the jury “that the doctrine applies only when the intentional attack was unforeseeable.” 292 Conn. at 169. Since in a negligent security case, it is necessary to prove that the criminal act was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, plaintiff’s counsel should be able to carry this burden.

§ 7-2 QUALIFICATIONS OF EXPERTS: INSURANCE ADJUSTER QUALIFIED TO TESTIFY ON COST OF REPAIR — SOVEREIGN BANK V. LICATA, 116 Conn. App. 483 (August 18, 2009); Bishop, J.; Trial Judge — Tyma, J.

RULE: An insurance adjuster with experience adjusting property damage claims is qualified to offer an opinion on the cost to repair damage to a home, despite the fact that he is not a contractor or engineer.

FACTS: Plaintiff filed an action to foreclose the defendant’s property. The defendant filed counterclaims, including a claim of negligent misrepresentation. Defendant alleged that as a result of the plaintiff’s actions, she moved out of her home and that while the home was vacant, pipes burst, resulting in water and mold damage. The negligent misrepresentation counterclaim was tried to a jury.

Defendant offered the testimony of Anthony Parise, an insurance adjuster specializing in property damage claims to estimate the cost of repair. Plaintiff objected on the ground that the adjuster lacked the necessary expertise on the cost of repairs. The trial court allowed the insurance adjuster to testify. The Appellate Court affirmed.

REASONING:
“On the basis of our careful review of the record, we conclude that the court correctly permitted Parise to testify as a property damage expert. At the time of trial, he had sixteen years of experience as a property damage adjuster, making him particularly suited for the task of determining the cost to repair the defendant’s home. We are not persuaded by Seven Oaks’ argument that Parise is unqualified as a property damage expert because he is not a contractor or engineer, for this court has long found that “it is not essential that an expert witness possess any particular credential, such as a license, in order to be qualified to testify, so long as his education or experience indicate that he has knowledge on a relevant subject significantly greater than that of persons lacking such education or experience.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pettit v. Hampton & Beech, Inc., 101 Conn. App. 502, 514, 922 A.2d 300 (2007); Conway v. American Excavating, Inc., 41 Conn. App. 437, 448-49, 676 A.2d 881 (1996).

116 Conn. App. at 510.

§ 7-2 CAUSATION TESTIMONY HELD ADMISSIBLE AFTER PORTER INQUIRY IN BREAST CANCER CASE — SAWICKI V. NEW BRITAIN GENERAL HOSPITAL, 115 Conn. App. 25 (2009); Bishop, J.; Trial Judge — Tanzer, J.

RULE: In the context of a motion in limine, the court conducted a Porter inquiry concerning plaintiff’s causation expert. Testimony by the expert regarding prognosis based upon tumor size, rate of growth, and number of positive lymph nodes, with appropriate references to medical literature, was held admissible.

FACTS: On August 2, 2000, plaintiff had a regularly scheduled mammogram with the defendant radiology group, Mandell & Blau, M.D.‘s, P.C. A radiologist employed by the group noticed new masses, found the mammogram inconclusive and recommended further evaluation with an ultrasound.

Plaintiff returned a week later for the ultrasound. A different radiologist decided to do another mammogram instead. He interpreted the mammogram as inconclusive, and recommended plaintiff return on “the normal schedule”. Whether that meant she should return in four months or a year was disputed.
Defendant alleged the plaintiff failed to return for a follow-up appointment in December 2000.

A mammogram done when plaintiff returned on June 4, 2001 revealed two highly suspicious masses. A biopsy done two days later confirmed cancer. The cancer had spread to the plaintiff’s lymph nodes.

Defendant filed a motion to preclude plaintiff’s causation expert pursuant to State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 (1997) on the ground that the testimony of expert, Dr. Gerald Sokol, was not supported by any scientifically reliable methodology. The trial court denied the motion in limine. The Appellate Court affirmed this part of the trial court’s ruling.

**REASONING:**

“The court held a Porter hearing at which Sokol testified that as a result of the defendant’s failure to diagnose the plaintiff’s cancer in August, 2000, her chance of recovery was diminished. Sokol testified that the most significant factor in determining survivability is the number of cancer positive lymph nodes or the volume of the tumor. He opined that if the plaintiff’s cancer had been found in August, 2000, instead of June, 2001, the plaintiff would have had far fewer positive nodes and a greater than 50 percent chance of survival. Sokol based his opinion on the number of positive lymph nodes found in July, 2001, the rate of growth of the plaintiff’s tumor and the fact that the number of positive nodes has a linear relation with the volume of cancerous tumors. In support of his opinion, Sokol cited several medical journal articles that he provided to the court.

“The court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude. In doing so, the court indicated that it considered Sokol’s testimony, the written materials that he provided to the court and the affidavit of the defendant’s expert witness. The court found that Sokol’s opinions were reliable and were based on scientific knowledge rooted in methods and procedures of science (including articles in peer reviewed literature pertinent to his opinions). The court further found that there is a general acceptance of the tumor node metastasis staging, that is, tumor, size, nodal involvement and prognostication of the outcome... [T]he relation

**RULE:** Although the horizontal gaze nystagmus test is the type of scientific evidence which requires a Porter inquiry, because a number of cases have held that the test satisfies Porter’s requirements for the admission of scientific evidence, trial courts no longer need conduct Porter hearings before admitting the evidence.

**FACTS:** In this drunk driving prosecution, the police officer administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and the defendant flunked. The defendant objected to the admission of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test because the officer did not test in strict accordance with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) protocol. The trial court held that the officer was properly trained in administering the test and interpreting the result. The officer had complied substantially with the standard of the NHTSA and any variance from those standards went to weight, not admissibility. The Supreme Court affirmed.

**REASONING:**

The Supreme Court endorsed a series of Appellate Court decisions holding that since the horizontal gaze nystagmus test has previously passed muster after a Porter inquiry, it is no longer necessary for the trial courts to hold additional Porter hearings.

“Although this court never has addressed the standards required for the admissibility of evidence of a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the Appellate Court has ‘consistently expressed [the] view that horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence is the type of scientific evidence that may mislead a jury in the absence of a proper foundation. ... [and has] enunciated [a] three part test that must be satisfied before such evidence is admissible. The test required that the state (1) satisfy the criteria for admission of scientific evidence, (2) lay a proper foundation with regard to the qualifications of the individual administering the test and (3) demonstrate that the test was conducted in accordance with relevant procedures.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Balbi, 89 Conn. App. 567, 573-74, 874 A.2d 288, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 919, 883 A.2d 1246 (2005). In addition, the Appellate Court has concluded that because the horizontal gaze nystagmus evidence satisfies the requirements of State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d
muger. The Supreme Court found error, though harmless.

**REASONING:**

The interviews would support McGurk's opinion that accidental ignition was eliminated as a cause of the fire only if he concluded that the defendant was lying and the son was telling the truth.

CCF § 7-3(a) only allows opinion testimony on the ultimate issue "where the trier of fact needs expert assistance in deciding the issue." (Example: breach of the standard of care in a medical malpractice case.) The Supreme Court held that the jury did not need McGurk's assistance in determining whether the defendant or his son was telling the truth.

"Put differently, McGurk's ultimate conclusion that the fire was intentionally set was founded not on his scientific investigation, but rather, on an assessment of the defendant's credibility with respect to his explanation of how the fire started, as well as the other circumstantial evidence proffered by the state, such as the defendant's motive and history of starting fires. Allowing McGurk to testify as to this conclusion, therefore, improperly invaded the province of the jury. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted McGurk to give an opinion about the ultimate issue in this case."

290 Conn. at 418-19.

**§ 7-4 FAILURE OF COURT TO RECOGNIZE BREACH AND CAUSATION ISSUES INTERTWINED — KLEIN V. NORWALK HOSPITAL, 113 Conn. App. 771, cert. granted, 292 Conn. 913 (2009); West, J.; Trial Judge — Tobin, J.**

**RULE:** Preclusion of expert's opinion on causation, although inextricably intertwined with expert's opinion on breach, found harmless when jury found no breach.

**FACTS:** Plaintiff alleged that a nurse inserting an intravenous line negligently hit a nerve in his arm, causing nerve palsy. Plaintiff's expert, an anesthesiologist, was disclosed on the standard of care and causation.

The defendant's expert, an orthopedic surgeon, opined that the nerve palsy was caused not by the insertion, but by Parsonage Turner Syndrome.

In anticipation of this testimony, plaintiff attempted to elicit from his expert his opinion that the plaintiff's nerve palsy was not caused by Parsonage Turner Syndrome. Defendant objected on the ground that plaintiff's expert disclosure did not state that the expert would be offering an opinion that the nerve palsy was not caused by Parsonage Turner Syndrome. The objection was sustained.

As expected, defendant's expert later testified that the nerve palsy was caused by Parsonage Turner Syndrome.

Interrogatories were submitted to the jury. The first interrogatory asked whether or not the defendant breached. The jury answered "no," and returned a defendant's verdict. The plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Court affirmed.

**REASONING:**

The Appellate Court never reached the issue of whether the ruling precluding the plaintiff's expert from testifying that plaintiff's nerve palsy was not caused by Parsonage Turner Syndrome was error.

The Appellate Court ignored the logical necessity that, if the jury accepted the defense expert's opinion that the nerve palsy was caused by Parsonage Turner Syndrome, they also accepted that the nurse did not negligently hit a nerve — and there was no breach of the standard of care.

The Supreme Court has granted cert.

**COMMENT:** An accepted method of proving negligence is eliminating non-negligent causes of an injury.

**VIII. Hearsay**

**§ 8-8 HEARSAY DECLARANT MAY BE IMPEACHED WITH EVIDENCE OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE — STATE V. CALABRESE, 116 Conn. App. 112 (2009); Gruendel, J.; Trial Judge — Levin, J.**

**RULE:** "When hearsay has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be impeached, and if impeached may be supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness." CCF §8-8.

**FACTS:** Defendant was accused of assaulting his 72-year old mother. On the night of the alleged assault, the mother
gave a statement to the police that the defendant “grabbed me by the arm and the hair and pulled me out of the bathroom.” At trial, the mother testified for the defendant and denied that her son grabbed her. Her police statement was placed in evidence pursuant to CCE §8-5(1).

Defendant sought to demonstrate to the jury his mother's bias and prejudice against him by playing for the jury statements she left on his answering machine almost three years before.

CCE §6-5 provides: “The credibility of a witness may be impeached by evidence showing bias for, prejudice against, or interest in any person or matter that might cause the witness to testify falsely.”

In its entirety, the answering machine recording contained a string of separate messages from the complainant as follows:

“Edan.

“Please pick up Edan.

“Would you pick up please?

“Pick up will you [PAUSE] Are you there?

“Are you there? [PAUSE] Pick up. Pick up if you're there. [PAUSE] I just wanted to say good luck and I love you. Are you there? Pick up. [PAUSE] Are you there?

Pick up. [PAUSE] Pick up! [PAUSE] pick up! [PAUSE] You prick!

“You'd better come down here and pick up the pork and bring my groceries down here before I call the police.

“Pick up. Won't you pick up?

“I asked for a goddamn sandwich and I never got it and I had a call from the victim’s advocate and you are in a hell of a lot of trouble if you don’t bring me my sandwich — cheeseburger! You better bring it here and leave it right on the doorstep you son of a bitch you bastard!

“Pick up. [PAUSE] Please pickup.”

“Please pick up. [PAUSE] Please pick up.

116 Conn. App. at 406 n. 17.

The trial court did not allow the defendant to play the recording. The Appellate Court found error and reversed.

REASONING:

This was the second case in which the defendant was convicted of assaulting his mother. In State v. Calabrese, 279 Conn. 393 (2006) the Supreme Court reversed the first conviction because the trial court did not allow the defendant to play the same recording. The trial of this second case took place before the Supreme Court’s decision.

The Appellate Court considered itself bound by the Supreme Court opinion. The State argued that the fact that the recording was made almost three years before the second assault should lead to a different result. The Appellate Court disagreed: “This is the type of evidence that a jury may fairly consider to be not necessarily affected by the passage of time.” 116 Conn. at 128.

IX. Authentication

§ 9-1a TEST FOR AUTHENTICATION OF COMPUTER-ENHANCED AND SLOWED VIDEO FOOTAGE — TRANSFER FROM VIDEO TO DVD — STATE V. M. ELENDEZ, 291 Conn. 693 (2009); Palmer, J.; Trial Judge — Alexander, J.

RULE: The Supreme Court applied the test for computer generated evidence set forth in State v. Swinton, 268 Conn. 781 (2004) to the parts of a DVD which slowed and/or enhanced videotaped images transferred to a DVD. However, the court held that no such foundation was required for a recording merely transferred from a videotape to a DVD and which constituted an exact copy.

FACTS: Prosecution for the sale of narcotics. An informant purchased narcotics from the defendant on October 8 and October 14, 2004. The informant was outfitted with a surveillance device hidden in his jacket, which captured audio and video and transmitted it to a nearby surveillance vehicle where it was recorded on videotape. Before trial, Special Agent John Rubinstein of the DEA delivered the videotape to Detective Brunetti of the West Haven Police Department. Brunetti transferred the contents of the 8 mm videotape to his computer's hard drive.

Brunetti then made four separate video segments of the October 8 drug buy: (1) an exact copy of the buy; (2) the same footage slowed to 10% of normal speed; (3) “enhanced” footage at normal speed; and (4) enhanced footage at 10% of normal speed. The same process was repeated for the October 14, 2004 transaction, for a total of eight segments.

Rubinstein testified at trial that he had hand-delivered the original videotape to Brunetti. Rubinstein further testified that he was present when the DVD copies were made, but that Brunetti did the work. Brunetti did not testify, William H.offman, the police officer who was in the van operating the videotape equipment, testified that the “enhanced” real time footage was an accurate representation of what he had seen in the surveillance van.

The defendant objected to the playing of the DVD on the basis that the State had not laid the foundation for “computer generated evidence” as set forth in State v. Swinton. The trial court allowed all eight segments of the DVD in evidence.

The Supreme Court found error as to six of the segments.

REASONING:

State v. Swinton was a lengthy opinion which set forth the guidelines for the admission of computer-enhanced photos or video and computer-generated images.

“"In addition to the reliability of the evidence itself, what must be established is the reliability of the procedures involved; as defense counsel must have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to the methods used. We note that “[r]eliability problems may arise through or in: (1) the underlying information itself; (2) entering the information into the computer; (3) the computer hardware; (4) the computer software (the programs or instructions that tell the computer what to do); (5) the execution of the instructions, which transforms the information in some way — for example, by calculating numbers, sorting names, or storing information and retrieving it later; (6) the output (the information as produced by the computer in a useful form, such as a printout of tax return information, a transcript of a recorded conversation, or an animated graphics simulation); (7) the security system that is used to control access to the computer; and (8) user errors, which may arise at any stage.”

Swinton, 268 Conn. at p. 813.

1 Apparently, Mom didn’t pick up on the irony of using this particular expletive.
At issue in Swinton were computer-generated images of the defendant's teeth which were then overlaid, or superimposed, upon photographs of bite marks on the victim's breast.

The State argued in State v. Melendez that images copied from a videotape onto DVD, even when slowed and/or "enhanced", did not require the same type of foundation. The Supreme Court agreed with the State regarding the segments which were merely copied without slowing or enhancement, but disagreed regarding the segments which were slowed and/or enhanced:

"In Swinton, we acknowledged the difficulty in establishing a precise definition of what constitutes "computer generated" evidence. Id., 804. We did, however, draw a distinction between technologies that may be characterized as merely presenting evidence and those that are more accurately described as creating evidence. Id. With that fundamental distinction in mind, we conclude that the portions of the DVD containing the exact duplicates of the original, unenhanced footage played in real time, simply do not constitute computer generated evidence for purposes of Swinton. Thus, to the extent that Brunetti merely transferred a copy of the contents of the original eight millimeter videotape to the DVD, that process, which Rubinstein witnessed, does not implicate the foundational standard that we adopted in Swinton. Although it is true, of course, that generating such a copy required the use of technology, that technology, which is widely used and readily available, involves nothing more than the reproduction of video footage from one medium to another. Indeed, the defendant has provided no reason why the admissibility of copies that are produced by that process — copies that have not been enhanced, altered or changed in any way — should be subject to the more rigorous requirements of Swinton. We conclude, therefore, that compliance with Swinton was not a prerequisite for admission of the unmodified video clips contained on the DVD.

"Of course, that evidence nevertheless was subject to the same foundational requirements for admission as any other demonstrative evidence. "Such evidence should be admitted only if it is a fair and accurate representation of that which it attempt to portray." Tripp v. Anderson, 1 Conn. App. 433, 435, 472 A.2d 804 (1984). Rubinstein testified that the footage contained on the DVD was the same as the footage contained on the eight millimeter videotape on which the drug transactions were captured as they were taking place. Moreover, Hoffman, who operated the equipment when those recordings were made, testified that the footage contained on the DVD was the same as the footage that he observed when it originally was captured. This testimony was sufficient to authenticate the unmodified video footage on the DVD. Consequently, that footage properly was introduced into evidence and considered by the jury."

Melendez, 291 Conn at pp. 709-11 (footnotes omitted).

As to the "enhanced" real-time computer-generated footage, the testimony of Hoffman (the officer in the van) that this footage was an accurate representation of what he saw on his monitor was insufficient.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found the error in admitting the slowed and enhanced segments to be harmless and affirmed the conviction.

Expert Disclosures

SECTION COMMENT: One overarching principle emerges from the cases that follow: our appellate courts do not reverse trial judges for allowing experts to testify despite technical errors, but do reverse trial judges for excluding experts from testifying because of such technicalities.

PRECLUSION OF EXPERT DISCLOSED SEVEN MONTHS BEFORE TRIAL REVERSED — Giblen V. Ghogawala, 111 Conn. App. 493 (2008); Bishop, J.; Trial judge — Karzin, J.

RULE: Preclusion of plaintiff's expert seven months before trial for failure to comply with discovery order, where plaintiff did not act in bad faith, held to be an abuse of discretion.

FACTS: Medical malpractice action in which the plaintiff was ordered to disclose his expert by June 2, 2006. On June 12, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to preclude. The plaintiff did not file an objection or any other response to the motion to preclude. On August 7, 2006, the court granted the motion to preclude.

On November 21, 2006 the plaintiff filed a motion to modify the scheduling order and disclosed her expert witness. In the motion to modify the scheduling order the plaintiff stated that her expert resided and practiced medicine in Peru. On December 18, 2006 the court denied the motion to modify.

On January 4, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue her motion to modify the scheduling order and indicated that her expert in Peru had been involved in a personal injury which interfered with his communication with the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel. Counsel represented that she had traveled to Peru to obtain the necessary opinion from her expert, and offered to transport her expert to the New York area, at plaintiff's expense, for deposition. The trial was scheduled for July 2007.

On January 23, 2007, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reargue. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted.

The Appellate Court reversed.

REASONING:

On appeal the plaintiff argued that the court's sanction was disproportionate to her violation. The Appellate Court agreed:

"Although we have previously upheld sanctions when expert disclosures were delayed and interfered with the orderly progress of trial, in this case, there was no claim by the defendant and no finding by the court that the late disclosure of the plaintiff's expert would interfere with the trial date. We therefore conclude that the preclusion of the plaintiff's expert was disproportionate to her violation of the scheduling order and that the court, therefore, improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant."

111 Conn. App. at 499.

FACT TESTIMONY, RELATING TO STANDARD OF CARE, MAY BE GIVEN BY DEFENDANT PHYSICIAN ALTHOUGH NOT DISCLOSED AS EXPERT — Wyzomierski V. Siracusa, 290 Conn. 225 (2009); Rogers, C.J.; Trial judge — Sferrazza, J.

RULE: A defendant physician who has not been disclosed as an expert may give fact testimony as to his reasons for pursu-
ing the particular course of treatment he chose for the patient.

FACTS: Medical malpractice action. The decedent had a history of early stage cirrhosis, but stopped drinking in 1980. In 1995 he had an episode of acute pancreatitis. On July 5, 2001 he had another episode and was referred to a surgeon, Dr. Francis Siracusa, for evaluation of the pancreatitis.

Siracusa ordered a CT scan and ultrasound which revealed gallstones in the decedent’s gall bladder. He recommended a laparoscopic cholecystectomy (removal of the gall bladder) and intraoperative cholangiogram (exploration of the bile ducts with dye).

Siracusa performed the surgery on July 25, 2001. The gall bladder was removed. The cholangiogram revealed a gallstone in the decedent’s common bile duct, which Siracusa was unable to flush out. He therefore recommended an endoscopic retrograde cholangiogram pancreatography (ERCP) with a papillotomy to eliminate the gallstone. The ERCP was done on July 30, 2001 by a gastroenterologist, who found no gallstone in the common bile duct and concluded that it must have passed on its own.

About a week later, decedent began to ooze blood from the crevice under the liver where the gall bladder had been removed, and began a steady decline. His liver and kidneys failed, and he died.

Plaintiff sued Siracusa alleging that the ERCP should have been done before the cholecystectomy because if the ERCP had been successful in eliminating the gallstone in the common bile duct, it would have resolved the pancreatitis without the need for the surgical removal of the gall bladder. The removal of the gall bladder was the cause of the bleeding, liver failure, and death.

The case was tried to the court. The defense did not disclose an independent expert or file an expert disclosure as to the defendant himself.

Siracusa testified as the only defense witness. Before he testified, the plaintiff moved that Siracusa be precluded “from providing explanations or justifications for his course of treatment of the decedent and any other matter beyond factual discussion or factual events.” 290 Conn. at 232.

The trial judge did not allow Siracusa to testify about the standard of care. However, he did allow Siracusa to testify about the reasons for his actions — why he did what he did. The Supreme Court affirmed.

REASONING:

“The purpose of Practice Book § 13-4(4) is to assist the parties in the preparation of their cases, and to eliminate unfair surprise by furnishing the opposing parties with the essential elements of a party’s claim. See Wexler v. Demiao, 280 Conn. 168, 188-89, 905 A.2d 1996 (2006).” 290 Conn. at 234.

The trial court found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the plaintiff could not be surprised that the defendant would testify not only about what he did, but the reasons he chose this course of treatment. Plaintiff’s claim that because Siracusa was not disclosed as an expert, counsel decided as a matter of strategy not to inquire into those matters during Siracusa’s deposition, failed to sway the trial court or the Supreme Court.

COMMENT:

Footnote 8 creates some confusion about whether or not a treating physician’s testimony constitutes expert opinion subject to the rules of disclosure applicable to experts. The authors’ opinion is that a treating physician’s opinion is subject to the expert disclosure rules. The recent expert disclosure rules, applicable to cases filed after January 1, 2008, resolve any ambiguity and outline exactly what expert disclosures are required for treating physicians.

Final Argument

COMMENTING ON FAILURE TO CALL ANY EXPERT PERMITTED — STURGEON V. STURGEON, 114 Conn. App. 682, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 903 (2009); Lavine, J.; Trial Judge — Pittman, J.

RULE: Although a party cannot argue that the jury should draw an adverse inference from an opponent’s failure to call a specific witness (without proof that the witness is available) a party can comment on the opponent’s failure to produce any expert testimony on an issue.

FACTS: The plaintiff and the defendant are brothers. On August 10, 2005, the plaintiff, a professional carpenter, was helping the defendant repair damage on the defendant’s house.

The plaintiff, on a ladder 14 to 15 feet high, alleged that his brother was supposed to be holding the bottom of the ladder. In fact, he had walked away. The ladder kicked out and the plaintiff fell on a fence surrounding a dog pen.

After the plaintiff’s case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to provide expert testimony on the standard of care for use of a ladder and on causation. The court concluded that expert testimony was not required and denied the motion.

During closing argument defendant’s counsel pointed out that the plaintiff had not produced any expert testimony on causation — whether or not, if the defendant had held the ladder, it would have kicked out anyway. Defendant’s counsel suggested that the plaintiff should have produced an engineer to provide the jury with evidence on this point.

The plaintiff objected to the argument. The trial court ruled that it would allow both sides to argue regarding what evidence was necessary to prove the case. The Appellate Court affirmed.

REASONING:

This opinion makes clear, in footnote 4, that C.G.S. §52-216(c), which prohibits counsel from arguing an adverse inference as to a witness unless that witness has been proved to be available, applies only to a specific witness, not to commenting on a lack of evidence or the failure to produce a type of evidence.

Thus, in the previous case Wyzomierski, plaintiff would have been entitled to comment on defendant’s failure to produce an independent expert. (See, Pederson v. Vahidy, 209 Conn. 510 (1989).)

This argument is also permitted where the defense does not avail itself of the opportunity to obtain an independent medical examination.

2 §52-216c provides: Failure to call a witness. Jury instruction prohibited; argument by counsel permitted. No court in the trial of a civil action may instruct the jury that an inference unfavorable to any party’s case may be drawn from the failure of any party to call a witness at such trial. However, counsel for any party to the action shall be entitled to argue to the trier of fact during closing arguments, except where prohibited by section 52-174, that the jury should draw no adverse inference from another party’s failure to call a witness who has been proven to be available to testify.
\textbf{Sufficiency of Evidence}


\textbf{Rule:} To establish causation, a plaintiff is not required to remove from the realm of possibility all nonnegligent causes of an accident. Instead, the plaintiff is required only to prove that it is more likely than not that the negligence on which the plaintiff relies was a proximate cause.

\textbf{Eyewitness testimony from the defendant, accident reconstruction, the police accident report and photographic evidence regarding the vehicles immediately after the collision are sufficient evidence for the jury to infer the defendant's negligent conduct caused the collision.}

\textbf{Facts:} The plaintiff, who had no memory of the collision, had been traveling east on Main Street in Stamford. The last thing he remembered was heading to a Jamaican restaurant on Main Street.

The defendant police officer had been traveling on Main Street, responding to a call on Clinton Avenue. The roadway was wet. The defendant testified he saw the plaintiff's car "at rest" on Main, facing the opposite direction, in front of the Jamaican restaurant. The defendant testified he started his left turn from Main onto Clinton Avenue and then suddenly the plaintiff's car was in front of him and he collided with it. The collision took place completely within the plaintiff's lane of travel.

In other words, the defendant turned left and collided with the plaintiff's car, which was proceeding straight through the intersection.

In addition to the defendant's testimony, the plaintiff put in evidence: 24 photographs of the accident scene; the police accident report; and accident reconstruction testimony from the investigating police officers.

After the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict on two grounds: governmental immunity and evidentiary insufficiency. The trial court initially granted the motion on the basis of governmental immunity.

After receiving supplemental briefs the court decided it had made a mistake in granting a directed verdict based on governmental immunity. However, the trial court granted the motion, relying principally on Winn v. Posadas, 281 Conn. 50 (2007), and finding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries.

The Appellate Court reversed.

\textbf{Reasoning:}

This brilliant Appellate Court decision by Judge Gruendel is the most comprehensive review in 40 years of what constitutes evidence sufficient to prove causation in a car accident case.

The opinion begins with this simple statement: "Directed verdicts are dis favored in this state." Burton, at p. 66. It then traces the case law, through Terminal Taxi v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313 (1968) and Toomey v. D'anaher, 161 Conn. 204 (1971), before turning to Winn v. Posadas and finally Hicks v. State, 287 Conn. 421 (2008), in which the Supreme Court backtracked on the draconian holding in Winn.

The opinion holds that the plaintiff presented enough circumstantial evidence for the jury to infer that it was the defendant's negligence, and not some other unknown cause, that was a proximate cause of the collision:

"In concluding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law as to causation, the trial court speculated as to other possible causes of the collision. For example, the court posited that the plaintiff's vehicle could have suffered a mechanical malfunction, that its windshield wipers were inoperable or even that a purchase from the Jamaican restaurant may have slipped off the seat, distracting the plaintiff. The jury was presented with no evidence of such events. In addition, noting that there was evidence that the left front tire of the plaintiff's vehicle "was flat after the collision," the court questioned whether a tire blowout had transpired. The invocation of such alternatives implicates a central precept articulated in Hicks and Terminal Taxi Co. regarding the proper evidentiary burden to be placed on a plaintiff in such cases. We repeat that "[t]he standard is not the plaintiff must remove from the realm of possibility all other potential causes of the accident; rather, it is that the plaintiff must establish that it is more likely than not that the cause on which the plaintiff relies was in fact a proximate cause of the accident." Hicks v. State, supra 287 Conn. 438; see also Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, supra, 156 Conn. 318 (plaintiff's proof need not "negate all possible circumstances which would excuse the defendant" or "rise to that degree of certainty which excludes every reasonable conclusion other than that reached by the jury"). As the Supreme Court has explained, ("[i]t may be conceded that the plaintiff's evidence did not exclude the [alternate causation] hypothesis... But she was not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [was the cause]. This being a civil case, it was enough if the evidence induced in the minds of the jurors a reasonable belief that the fact was so... The purpose of the circumstantial evidence was to show that it was more probable that the defendant [was the cause], and to satisfy the jury in view of all the testimony that the defendant probably did it. If it was sufficient for this purpose it was enough." (Citation omitted) Bradbury v. South Norwalk, 80 Conn. 298, 301-302, 68 A. 321 (1907); see also Engenro v. New Haven Gas Co., 152 Conn. 513, 517, 209 A.2d 174 (1965) ("[w]e do not required that the plaintiff's evidence exclude every other hypothesis but her own"); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 41, p. 269. Although it is conceivable that the plaintiff's vehicle suffered a tire blowout in the moments prior to the collision, the evidence suggests that it is more likely that the flat tire was a casualty of a head-on automobile collision. Indeed, the court's finding that (1) the plaintiff's vehicle "had gone through the... intersection proceeding straight on Main Street" just prior to the collision, (2) the plaintiff's vehicle came to rest "parallel to the double yellow line and well within [its] lane" following the collision and (3) "[t]he bumper of the police car had crumpled the front bumper and left front fender of the [plaintiff's vehicle] back approximately to the point of its left front tire" tend to undermine that hypothetical."

115 Conn. App. at 85-86.
FACTS: Assault prosecution in which the defendant was Hispanic. The State exercised a preemptory challenge against B, also Hispanic. The defendant raised a challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The prosecutor responded that he was challenging the juror because she was a teacher and because she had never heard of the Latin Kings. The trial court denied the Batson challenge. The Appellate Court affirmed.

REASONING:

The Appellate Court was clearly impressed by the fact that the prosecutor had already accepted two Hispanic jurors. In addition, the Appellate Court pointed out that use of preempotory challenges on the basis of employment has been held permissible.

Juror Misconduct

JURORS' EXPOSURE TO EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE REQUIRES COURT TO CONDUCT IMMEDIATE INQUIRY — STATE V. KAMEL, 115 Conn. App. 338 (2009); Lavine, J.; Trial Judge — Groins, J.

RULE: When a jury is exposed to extrinsic evidence, the court must hold an inquiry to determine whether harm has occurred.

FACTS: The defendant ran a store in Norwalk. When a state marshal went to the premises to take possession, take an inventory, and change the locks, he found a black bag which the defendant said was his. When the defendant refused to leave, police officers arrived. They arrested the defendant for criminal trespass and interfering with an officer. They took him to the police station with his black bag.

In the bag, the police found drugs and a pair of brass knuckles. Defendant was charged with drug possession, but not with possession of the brass knuckles.

At trial, the arresting officer testified as to the contents of the black bag, including the brass knuckles. The State moved to introduce the brass knuckles into evidence. The defendant objected on the ground that the brass knuckles were not relevant. The court sustained the objection.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges. The trial judge did not inform counsel at that time and it was not put on the record.

Three months later, the court summoned the prosecutor and the defendant (who was representing himself) and informed them that she had seen the brass knuckles in the jury deliberation room. She further informed them that the jurors understood they were not supposed to consider the brass knuckles and did not.

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion. The Appellate Court reversed.

REASONING:

The Appellate Court held that the trial court was required to conduct an inquiry immediately after discovering the brass knuckles. It further held that the failure to conduct the inquiry immediately required reversal, and that under the circumstances a remand was an insufficient remedy.

COMMENT:

Given the popularity and availability of the internet, more information is easily accessible to jurors, for whom the temptation to investigate or research a case may be hard to resist.

JUROR MISCONDUCT EVALUATED ON OBJECTIVE STANDARD — SAWICKI V. NEW BRITAIN GENERAL HOSPITAL, 115 Conn. App. 25 (2009); Bishop, J.; Trial Judge — Tanzer, J.

RULE: The test for evaluating juror misconduct is an objective standard: whether or not a reasonable person would conclude the misconduct probably affected the verdict. The test is not whether in fact the misconduct did affect the verdict. Therefore, statements by jurors that the misconduct did not affect their deliberations or decision are irrelevant and should not be elicited or considered.

FACTS: See §7-2, above. Affidavits and testimony taken after the verdict made clear that the jurors had discussed the evidence before the case was submitted to them and that some jurors had expressed opinions regarding the likely outcome of the case before the case was submitted to them.

In a comprehensive hearing after the verdict, most of the jurors confirmed that...
the misconduct occurred, but testified that it did not affect the deliberations or their decision in the case. The trial judge relied on that testimony in denying the motion for a mistrial. The Appellate Court reversed.

REASONING:
A trial court should not inquire as to the jurors’ mental processes, or as to whether or not the misconduct affected their decision. Rather, the trial court should ascertain what the misconduct was and then, based on an objective evaluation of the extent of the misconduct, decide whether or not the misconduct probably affected the result.

“In other words, the court did not follow the analytical path set forth by this decisional law. Rather than focus on the nature and quality of the jury misconduct, the court fastened its decision on responses by the jurors that they followed the court’s jury instructions notwithstanding their predeliberation discussions of the evidence and expressions of opinion regarding the plaintiff’s case. Specifically, the court found that the jurors followed the court’s instructions not to decide the issue before hearing all of the evidence. The court focused on the testimony of the jurors and the assertions they made during the hearing as to the actual impact the misconduct had on them.”

115 Conn. App. At 39 (footnote omitted).

“In other words, the court employed an incorrect legal analysis in determining whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by focusing its attention on the mental processes of the jurors and drawing conclusions from their testimony as to the actual effect of the misconduct, and not the probable effect of their misconduct as objectively judged by its nature and quality.”

Id. at 40.

The Appellate Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that it was not probable that the misconduct prejudiced the plaintiff’s case.

Hearing in Damages
DEFENDANT DEFAULTED FOR DISCIPLINARY REASON MAY NOT AVAILABLE SELF OF PRACTICE BOOK SEC. 17-34(a) — PETERSON V. WOLDEYOHANNES, 111 Conn. App. 784 (2008); Gruendel, J.; Trial Judge — Wagner, J.

RULE: Where a disciplinary default has entered against a defendant and the defendant has failed to cure the underlying cause of the default, the defendant is not permitted to take advantage of Conn. Pract. Book Section 17-34(a).

FACTS: Plaintiff sued defendant to enforce an alleged partnership regarding the purchase of six condominium units. Plaintiff alleged that she and the defendant had agreed to buy the units together and instead the defendant purchased them alone.

During discovery, plaintiff requested that the defendant produce telephone records which she thought would reflect contacts between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant and attorneys involved in the sale of the units, and the defendant and the sellers of the units. The court ordered the defendant to turn over the records, and she did not do so. She was defaulted.

On the day before a hearing in damages, the defendant partially complied with the discovery order. On the second day of the hearing, the court allowed the defendant to file a notice pursuant to Practice Book §17-34(a), which provides:

“(a) In any hearing in damages upon default, the defendant shall not be permitted to offer evidence to contradict any allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, except such as relate to the amount of damages, unless notice has been given to the plaintiff of the intention to contradict such allegations and of the subject matter which the defendant intends to contradict, nor shall the defendant be permitted to deny the right of the plaintiff to maintain such action, nor shall the defendant be permitted to prove any matter of defense, unless written notice has been given to the plaintiff of the intention to deny such right or to prove such matter of defense.”

Prior case law established that the entry of the default shifts the burden of proof on the allegations in the complaint to the defendant, and entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages.

After the hearing in damages, the court entered judgment for the defendant. The Appellate Court reversed.

REASONING:
The Appellate Court noted that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the defendant’s continuing failure to provide the telephone records

“The plaintiff argues, therefore, that because she never received much of the requested discovery, the court should have prevented the defendant from filing a notice of defenses pursuant to Practice Book §17-34(a) and from actually presenting defenses to the underlying claims of liability. This is a novel argument that has not before been considered by an appellate court in Connecticut. Essentially, the plaintiff asserts that when a disciplinary default has been entered against a defendant for failure to comply with a discovery order, it should not be permitted to avail itself of Practice Book §17-34(a) until it has demonstrated compliance with the underlying court order. We agree.”

111 Conn. App. at 792.

“In this case, the defendant’s noncompliance may have caused the plaintiff’s inability to rebut the defendant’s defenses. We conclude, therefore, that when a defendant has failed to cure the underlying cause of the disciplinary default, it will not be permitted to take advantage of its behavior and of the opportunity to defend on the merits provided by Practice Book §17-34(a) during the hearing in damages.”

Id. at 793.
Flying Blind: The Ramifications of Hamilton v. USAA

by: Paul A. Slager and Amanda R. Whitman

Introduction

It is a recurrent, and frustrating, scenario: the plaintiff has a strong case against an insured defendant, but the carrier disclaims coverage, asserting that the conduct alleged in the complaint is not covered. The two obvious options are unpalatable: one is to abandon the claim; the other is to pursue the case to judgment and only then hope to establish coverage by bringing an entirely new action, this time against the insurance company for subrogation under General Statutes § 38a-321. In Hamilton v. USAA, 115 Conn. App. 774, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 924 (2009), we tried a third, more sensible approach, only to see the Appellate Court elevate form over substance in a decision that requires plaintiffs to take the long way around to justice.

A Different Approach

Our client was the conservator for a mentally disturbed woman whose counselor had taken advantage of her trust in him by sexually exploiting her, in violation of the code of professional ethics and Connecticut criminal law. In fact, the counselor pled guilty to sexual assault in the second degree (General Statutes § 53a-71) and served more than three years in prison. On learning that the two insurance companies involved both disclaimed coverage, we filed declaratory judgment actions, asking that determinations about coverage be made before the underlying case was fully litigated. We also simultaneously sought a stay of the underlying case until after the declaratory judgment actions were resolved. Our commonsense argument: in order for the plaintiff to make an informed decision about whether to make the emotional investment required to pursue a particularly painful and intrusive lawsuit, she should know whether insurance proceeds would be available if she obtained a significant judgment against defendant.

This notion is sensible and consistent with Connecticut’s longstanding public policy in favor of disclosing insurance information to plaintiffs. It was particularly compelling in our case: the defendant had taken advantage of our client’s emotional vulnerability to inflict devastating emotional injuries. Given these disturbing facts, we urged that the plaintiff should have the right to know whether there existed insurance coverage before having her life, including the specifics of her experiences being victimized by defendant, opened and explored in painful detail by opposing counsel.

The Lower Court: Motions to Dismiss the Declaratory Judgment Complaints

Both insurance companies predictably moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that (1) the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the action because she was not a party to the contract or a third party beneficiary; (2) the matter was not ripe because the plaintiff had not yet obtained a judgment against the insured; and (3) the availability of a remedy under General Statutes § 38a-321 (a subrogation action following a judgment in the underlying case) precluded the use of declaratory judgment. The Superior Court (Shaban, J.) granted defendant’s motion.

At the time of the Superior Court’s decision, there was no appellate authority on the issue of whether a tort plaintiff may bring a declaratory judgment action against the defendant tortfeasor’s insurer for a determination on insurance coverage prior to obtaining a judgment against the insured. However, a number of other Superior Courts which had addressed the issue, had held that a personal injury plaintiff may bring a declaratory judgment action to determine the existence of insurance coverage for her claims prior to obtaining a judgment against the underlying tortfeasor. See American State Ins. Corp. v. Peci, 15 Conn. L. Rptr. 97, 1995 WL 416269 (Conn. Super. Jul. 7, 1995) (Stodolink, J.); Brown v. United Services Auto. Assn., No. CV 04-4004645-S, 2005 WL 3623845 (Conn. Super. Dec. 6, 2005) (Licari, J.); Wynn v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 51, 1994 WL 271824 (Conn. Super. June 13, 1994) (Lewis, J.).

Plaintiff Seeks Reversal

We appealed, arguing that the trial court’s decision was not only contrary to the trial court’s decision, (1) our plaintiff was not required to be a party to the contract or a third party beneficiary in order to have standing; rather the requirement for standing to bring a declaratory judgment action is set forth at Practice Book § 17-55(1); (2) the case was ripe for adjudication because there was an actual and substantial issue in dispute which requires settlement between the parties, as required by Practice Book § 17-55(2); and, (3) the trial court had ignored Connecticut law providing that the availability of alternative remedies does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action.

Regarding standing, Practice Book § 17-55(1) requires that “[t]he party seeking the declaratory judgment has an interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to the party’s rights or other jural relations.” Id. (emphasis added). We argued that the plaintiff readily met this standard because under Connecticut law, “[i]t is generally held that an injured person having a claim against an insured tortfeasor has a legal interest in a coverage dispute with the insurer and must be either notified or joined as a party in a declaratory judgment action to decide the coverage question.” Connecticut Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Raymark Corp., 215 Conn. 224, 228 (1990) (emphasis added). The insurance companies argued in response that the plaintiff’s legal interest for purposes of standing must be based on whether a contract or personal right, and the plaintiff did not have a personal right until she had obtained a judgment against the defendants’ insured.

Regarding ripeness, Practice Book § 17-55(2) requires that “[t]here is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties.” Id. This provision “means no more than that there must appear a sufficient practical need for the determination of the matter.” Bombero v.

(Continued on page 18)
Planning and Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Trumbull, 40 Conn. App. 75, 79 (1996). We argued that the plaintiff had a practical need to resolve a substantial uncertainty over the defendants’ obligations under the insurance policy, in advance of litigating the underlying action to judgment, in order to: (1) properly assess the benefits of continuing to litigate the underlying action; (2) have an opportunity to settle the underlying action; and (3) request properly tailored jury interrogatories in the underlying action to avoid the need to re-litigate factual issues in a subrogation action. These interests would be lost if the plaintiff were required to complete discovery and a full trial on the merits before even seeking a declaration on the coverage issues. In response, the insurance companies pointed to the possibility — which in this case was entirely theoretical in view of the glaring, criminal fault of the defendant — that the plaintiff might somehow lose the case against the tortfeasor, in which case there would be no basis for a declaratory judgment.

Regarding the availability of alternative remedies, Connecticut law leaves no question that “the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction over suits for declaratory relief despite the adequacy of other legal remedies.” English v. Coventry, 183 Conn. 362, 364 (1981); accord Cosina v. Cosina, 24 Conn. App. 190, 192 (1991); Leoni v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 21 Conn. App. 77, 82 (1990). The defendants nevertheless argued that a court may, in its discretion, decline to allow a declaratory judgment action when there is an alternative remedy.

**Decision Affirmed**

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action. In doing so, the Court only addressed the ripeness issue, holding that claims were not ripe because they were contingent on the outcome of the underlying negligence action. The court reasoned: “Until there has been a judicial determination that Thorson [the tortfeasor] is liable to the plaintiff, the question of whether the defendant is obligated to provide insurance coverage in this declaratory judgment action is a hypothetical one.” 115 Conn. App. at 780. The court further declared:

> the allegations in the Thorson action are known, but the evidence that the plaintiff will present in her effort to prove [her] allegations and the jury's findings are not. Until the evidence is known, as well as the jury's verdict with respect to those allegations, it is not possible to determine whether the defendant is obligated to indemnify Thorson. The action therefore seeks the answer to a hypothetical question, which is not the purpose of a declaratory judgment action.

Id. at 782.¹ We filed a petition for certification for review by the Supreme Court, which was denied. See Hamilton v. USAA, 293 Conn. 924 (2009).

**Consequences for Plaintiffs**

The Appellate Court’s decision in Hamilton was not only deeply disappointing to us and our client but has troubling broader implications. The apparent import of the Appellate Court’s decision in Hamilton v. USAA is that a negligence victim may never bring a declaratory judgment action against the tortfeasor’s insurer to resolve uncertainties over insurance coverage prior to obtaining a judgment against the insured. As a result, in cases where a tortfeasor’s insurance company has disclaimed coverage, negligence victims will be required to go through the emotional and financial expense of litigating their claim to obtain a judgment which may be worthless if it is ultimately determined that there is no insurance coverage in a subsequent subrogation action. This rule would seem to make disclaiming coverage an appealing first option for an insurance company seeking to deter a vulnerable plaintiff from seeking recovery against an insured party.

To us, this result is contrary to Connecticut public policy, which overwhelmingly favors giving negligence victims accurate information about the availability of insurance for their claims in advance of obtaining a judgment against a tortfeasor, a policy most recently enacted into law as General Statutes § 52-200a. We urge our colleagues not only to be wary of the dangers that Hamilton has created but to look for an opportunity to undo its damage by bringing an appropriate case to the Supreme Court or seeking correction from the legislature.

Paul A. Slager and Amanda R. Whitman are attorneys who focus their practice on civil cases involving catastrophic events, including sexual abuse and professional negligence. Both practice with the Stamford firm, Silver Golub & Teltell LLP.

¹ Although plaintiff sought a declaration on USAA’s duty to defend, which is based on plaintiff’s allegations alone, in addition to a declaration on USAA’s duty to indemnify, the court declined to address whether the issue of USAA’s duty to defend was ripe noting that the parties did not analyze the duty to defend issue in their papers.
SETTLEMENT OF $900,000
Confidential as to Party Names; Medical Malpractice Mediation Before Hon. Robert Holzberg

A 60-year-old non-smoker had a chest x-ray ordered by her orthopedist as part of pre-operative testing for upcoming elective knee replacement. This x-ray showed a 2.5 cm. mass suspicious for lung cancer, requiring immediate work-up. The radiologist called the orthopedist’s office that day to report the finding, and then faxed the radiology report, which clearly documented the mass and that its existence had been communicated to the orthopedist. The orthopedist saw the plaintiff in the office the next day but never told her about the abnormal x-ray. He performed the knee replacement surgery in May 2005 and despite many, many opportunities in pre and post-operative office visits and phone calls, the doctors never told the plaintiff about the abnormal chest x-ray.

The plaintiff was diagnosed with Stage IV metastatic lung cancer in February 2007, a 21 month delay. Plaintiff’s expert opined that in May 2005, plaintiff’s cancer was at Stage 1A. If timely diagnosed, she would have had surgery to remove the affected lobe of her lung. She would not have required chemotherapy or radiation and would have had a “surgical cure”. Defendant’s expert suggested that the May 2005 x-ray alone was not sufficiently refined to measure the mass and that, if a CT scan had been done, it would have revealed a nodule measuring greater than 3 cm., which would place the plaintiff into a more advanced stage of cancer with a significantly reduced chance of survival.

As a result of the delay, the plaintiff had inoperable metastatic lung cancer, underwent chemotherapy and radiation, and had a 24 month life expectancy.

Prior to suit being filed, the case settled at mediation with Judge Robert Holzberg on February 19, 2008.

Submitted by Barry Sinoway, Esq. and Gayle Sullivan, Esq. of Sinoway, McEnery, Messer & Sullivan, PC, North Haven.

MEDIATED SETTLEMENT OF $500,000
Collision With College Shuttle Bus

The case of Aulogia v. Ebberts, Docket No. CV-02-0470641-S, resulted in a mediated settlement of $500,000.

Plaintiff Victoria Aulogia was a 19-year-old sophomore at Quinnipiac University in Hamden, Connecticut. On April 12, 2002, she was on a university sponsored shuttle bus heading south on Whitney Avenue in Hamden, when the bus was struck by a vehicle owned by Arthur Ebberts, Jr. Ebberts was traveling north immediately before the collision and crossed the double yellow line into oncoming southbound traffic. The shuttle bus was struck mid-body on the driver side. Aulogia slid off the seat, sustaining compound fractures to her tibia and fibia of her right leg. She was taken by ambulance to a local hospital where surgery was performed by Dr. Bradford Burns in which rods and instrumentation was used to stabilize the positioning of the fractures.

Aulogia missed two weeks of classes. She made a remarkable recovery, testifying in her deposition that on occasion, she was able to play tennis since the injury. Dr. Burns gave her a minimal permanency rating. Additionally, she sought the opinion of Dr. Goodkind, a New Haven plastic surgeon who opined that her lower leg would benefit from plastic revision surgery.

In addition to Ebberts, the owner of the shuttle bus (Dattco, Inc) was also named as defendant in an action commenced in New Haven Superior Court.

In his deposition, defendant Ebberts admitted to consuming one or more alcoholic drinks at a professional function held earlier that evening at approximately 6 p.m. The collision occurred at approximately 10:20 p.m. that evening. Based on this testimony, plaintiff’s counsel filed discovery seeking the production of Ebberts’s medical records for the medical treatment he had for the injuries he sustained in this collision. Judge Thompson granted these discovery requests, which revealed a serum ethanol level of 246. Counsel retained Dr. Brian Pape of Stamford, a toxicologist, who opined that based on a number of factors, including his age and weight, Mr. Ebberts had been under the influence of alcohol in excess of the legal limit when this collision occurred some four hours earlier. Counsel then moved to add an additional count pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §14-295, which was granted by the Court.

By agreement of the parties, the case was mediated before Attorney Leslie Brimmer of Hartford. The case settled for $500,000. Dattco, Inc., owner of the shuttle bus, did not contribute to the settlement and the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her case against the operator of the shuttle bus and Dattco once the above resolution with Ebberts was achieved. The operator of the bus and Dattco were represented by Charles M. Fresher; Arthur Ebberts, Jr. was represented by Chris Wanat of Milano & Wanat, LLC of Branford.


SETTLEMENT OF $13.5 MILLION
Industrial Work Site Accident

Plaintiff, a 27-year-old male, was injured in an industrial work site accident when a cable snapped and struck him in the face. He suffered injuries, including permanent loss of vision in both eyes, multiple facial and skull fractures, total loss of the sense of smell, partial loss of the sense of taste and cervical, knee and hand pain.

The parties agreed to a settlement of $13.5 million.

Submitted by William M. Blos, Esq. of Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C., Bridgeport.
VERDICT OF $1,838,653
Premises Liability
47-Year-Old Male

In the case of Michael A. Bowman v. Louis A. Lestorti, Jr., Trustee for Super 8 Motel-Waterbury, CT, filed in the Superior Court for the judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury (Docket No. UWy-CV-04-4000846 S), a jury returned a verdict on January 18, 2008 of $1,838,653 in favor of a veterinarian from Kentucky, who fractured his ankle after slipping and falling at a motel in Waterbury. The breakdown was slightly more than $1,000,000 for economic damages and $1,000,000 for non-economic damages. The jury found the plaintiff 10% comparatively negligent.

On March 5, 2002, the plaintiff, Michael A. Bowman, stopped around 1:00 a.m. at the Super 8 Motel in Waterbury, Connecticut. The plaintiff had never stayed at this particular motel. The plaintiff slipped and fell on ice while returning to his truck after checking in, severely fracturing his right ankle. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent in failing to remedy a defective condition and in failing to provide sufficient lighting in the area where the fall occurred.

The plaintiff presented testimony from the general manager of the motel, Kenneth Clavette, who testified that water would collect in the area where the plaintiff fell and froze during the winter months. Mr. Clavette further admitted that this condition had existed for several years prior to March 5, 2002, and that he was not aware of any action taken to address the problem, other than the application of sand/salt. The plaintiff also presented the testimony of a meteorologist, Robert Cox, who testified that the specific ice which caused the plaintiff to fall had existed for greater than 24 hours at the time of the plaintiff’s fall.

The plaintiff received treatment for his injury in both Connecticut and Kentucky. In Kentucky, the plaintiff required immediate open reduction with internal fixation for a bimalleolar fracture involving the right medial malleolus and fibula. Approximately a year and a half after his original surgery, in a follow-up with his treating physician, Dr. Seligson, the plaintiff underwent a second surgery to remove a screw from his right ankle. The plaintiff incurred medical bills in the amount of $23,417.34.

The plaintiff had fractured his medial malleolus in the same ankle in 1999, which required the insertion of screws in the right tibial condyle. The injury resulted from a motor vehicle accident for which the plaintiff brought a lawsuit and recovered compensation from the responsible party. In this trial, the plaintiff’s expert testified that the 1999 injury fully healed and did not contribute to any of the problems the plaintiff experienced following his injury in Connecticut.

The plaintiff made an interesting claim for loss of earning capacity because of the effects the injury had on his ability to work. The plaintiff was a self-employed equine veterinarian, specializing in the field of lameness in show horses. This work entailed extensive travel and working on his feet, with a great deal of work in a position similar to a catcher in baseball. As a result of his injury, the plaintiff testified that the speed at which he could perform this work had diminished significantly, causing him to work longer hours to service the same amount of clients. His income on paper did not decrease (it in fact increased significantly when he adjusted his rates according to the market). Because of the longer hours, the plaintiff argued that his “hourly rate” had decreased significantly and thus he had an impairment of earning capacity. This, combined with the time he completely lost while totally disabled and his medical bills, led to the jury’s award of over $1,000,000 in economic damages.

Finally, the plaintiff testified about the plan he and his wife made to create a business which gave balance between his work and family. Reasonable hours and a good salary gave them the best of both worlds. Both the plaintiff and his wife testified about the non-economic losses that his injury caused in destroying this balance, both economically and non-economically. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1,000,000 in non-economic damages.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff and defendants shared responsibility for the fall and that the plaintiff’s claims of loss of earning capacity were unfounded in light of the fact that his income on paper never decreased.

It should be noted that seven out of the eight jurors selected were between the ages of 19 and 30 years old.

SETTLEMENT OF $3,000,000
State Dump Truck Injuries to Town Worker

The case of Miles Corey v. The State of Connecticut, (Docket No. CV-01-0103469-S(X04)), was filed in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Middletown and removed to the Complex Litigation Docket, and the parties reached an agreement to settle for $3,000,000 after two days of mediation with Judge Frederick Freedman.

On June 7, 2000, the plaintiff, age 37, was working at a town landfill when members of the Connecticut National Guard sought his help in removing a large concrete block from the back of a State owned dump truck. The truck was not functioning properly because the hydraulic pump required to lift the bed did not have the appropriate level of fluid. Despite noticeable signs of malfunction, the guardsmen continued to operate the truck in an effort to clear its bed and, after several failed attempts, they solicited the plaintiff’s help, who assumed a position in the back of the dump truck.

As the plaintiff stood in the bed of the truck, a guardswoman operating the truck suddenly and without warning accelerated forward, ejecting the plaintiff from the truck and causing him to slam his foot on the tailgate of the truck before being thrown to the ground. The guardswoman denied she moved the truck.

The plaintiff suffered a comminuted displaced fracture to the left ankle and a fibular shaft fracture. He underwent surgery under general anesthesia. He was required to undergo a second surgery for removal of the external fixator one month later.

During the pendency of his lawsuit, the plaintiff’s condition worsened and he developed a progressive virus deformaty of this left lower extremity resulting in a partial non-union of his fracture. He was further diagnosed with a deep peroneal nerve injury, clawing of the second through fifth toes, and post traumatic degenerative arthritis of the first metatarsal phalange joint. During the next four years, the plaintiff underwent six surgeries. The doctors and experts retained by Miles...
assigned a permanency rating of between 77% to 88%, and recommended amputation as a viable option to reduce the chronic pain. The plaintiff has thus far resisted amputation as an option.

Although the plaintiff had testified that the truck was being moved at the time of the accident, the State sought summary judgment on the grounds that Conn. Gen. Statute § 52-556, the motor vehicle waiver of immunity, did not apply and there was no operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The trial court denied summary judgment and the State appealed. During the pendency of the appeal, the mediation conducted by Judge Frederick Freedman resulted in a settlement of $3,000,000.

Submitted by Robert I. Reardon, Jr., Esq., of The Reardon Law Firm, P.C., New London.

VERDICT OF $500,000
Tubal Ligation Without Consent

In the case of MaryAnn Daly v. Leonard Goldstein, M.D., which was filed in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Danbury at Danbury (Docket No. CV 02 0344968-S), the jury returned a verdict of $500,000.

In July 2000, MaryAnn Daly was admitted to Danbury Hospital for what was supposed to be a routine and induced delivery. During labor, an emergency suddenly arose because the baby developed a non-reassuring heart rate. A stat C-section was called. During the moments before the plaintiff was taken to the operating room, defendant Leonard Goldstein, M.D. leaned over and asked if she would like to have him perform a tubal ligation as well. At the time, the plaintiff, age 38, had five children. The plaintiff, in reply, yelled that she could not think about such a thing under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the defendant went ahead and performed the tubal ligation.

At trial, Dr. Goldstein pointed out that, although he had not obtained the plaintiff’s signature on the consent form, he, as the plaintiff was being taken to the O.R., had quickly obtained the plaintiff’s husband’s signature. The defendant also claimed that at several prenatal appointments he had counseled the plaintiff and, at one appointment her husband as well, on tubal ligation and that the couple said they would think about it. Mr. and Mrs. Daly roundly denied any such discussions. Also, at trial M.R. Daly testified that, in a moment of fear that his wife could die, he had hurriedly signed the consent form. This was in reply to Dr. Goldstein having implied that his wife was in great danger.

After four hours of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of $500,000 in favor of the plaintiff. M.R. Daly was awarded no money for his loss of consortium claim.


CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT OF $850,000

Medical Malpractice: Failure to Diagnose Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm

In this medical malpractice case, Estate of John Doe et al v. Unnamed Hospital, which was filed in the Superior Court, the parties reached an agreement to settle for $850,000.00 during jury selection.

The plaintiff’s decedent, a 71-year-old retired male, presented to the defendant internist at an urgent care clinic operated by the defendant hospital seeking emergency medical treatment for severe left back, flank and left-lower quadrant pain. At that time, the plaintiffs’ decedent informed the defendants that the pain began suddenly and that he had not experienced any fall, trauma, gross hematuria, nausea or vomiting. Thereafter, the defendant doctor diagnosed the plaintiffs’ decedent with a kidney stone, prescribed Vicodin to him, and released him from his care. In releasing the plaintiffs’ decedent, the only instructions he was given was to increase his fluid intake.

Four hours later, after the plaintiffs’ decedent returned to his home, he collapsed in the presence of his wife, who then called 911. The plaintiffs’ decedent was administered CPR by emergency technicians that arrived on the scene and he was taken by ambulance to the hospital in full cardiac arrest. Shortly thereafter, he was pronounced dead in the emergency department at the defendant hospital. The autopsy revealed that the plaintiffs’ decedent died from rupture of an abdominal aortic aneurysm.

The experts retained by the plaintiffs all agreed that the defendants deviated from the standard of care by failing to adequately evaluate, diagnose, and treat the plaintiff’s decedent when he first arrived in the urgent care clinic. These opinions were supported by the defendant doctor’s failure to order the appropriate diagnostic tests, which were readily available and necessary given the age, history, and symptoms with which the plaintiffs’ decedent presented. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ experts agreed that had a proper diagnosis been made when the plaintiffs’ decedent first arrived at the urgent care clinic, and had he undergone proper treatment, including surgical repair of his aneurysm, he would have then survived and lived his full and normal life expectancy.

On April 16, 2008, the first day of jury selection, the parties agreed to settle the case for $850,000.

Submitted by Robert I. Reardon, Jr., Esq., of The Reardon Law Firm, P.C., New London.

JUDGMENT OF $402,146.68
Breach of Fiduciary Duty

In the case of Gerald Marciano v. Neil W. Kraner and the Law Offices of George B. Bickford, filed in the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford, (Docket No. CV 05-4009042S), the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $196,000. Plaintiff filed an offer of compromise for $120,000, which was rejected by the defendants. Defendants countered with an offer of one dollar, which the plaintiff rejected. The rejections resulted in a statutory claim for prejudgment interest of $83,756.88, costs of $1,430.00, interest on costs of $609.80 and attorney’s fees of $350.00, all totaling $402,146.68.

The plaintiff, conservator of his father’s estate, retained the defendants to preserve the assets of the Estate and to protect the rights in the house which his father purchased for his benefit and in which he had been residing for several years. The plaintiff also sought the defendants’ counsel to protect his interest for care services given to his elderly parents.

Attorney Kraner recommended to the plaintiff that as conservator, he should transfer the assets of his father’s estate to his disabled brother and the disabled brother would then transfer the house and a portion of the estate assets to the plaintiff. Attorney Kraner advised the plaintiff that such transfer would allow the plaintiff to obtain ownership of the home and
$45,000 of assets from the estate and also qualify the father for Title XIX benefits without penalty.

To implement the proposed “plan,” the defendant Kraner prepared the deeds to accommodate the transfer of the house to the plaintiff. Both deeds were prepared and executed on the same date and time, in successive order on October 26, 2000. The first deed represented a transfer of the house by the plaintiff, as conservator of the father’s estate, from the estate to the disabled brother, Frances Marciano, Jr. The second deed, also prepared by the defendant Kraner, represented a transfer of the same real estate to the plaintiff from the disabled brother. Both brothers left the closing together and the plaintiff left with the understanding that Attorney Kraner would cause both deeds to be recorded with the Barkhamsted Town Clerk.

Attorney Kraner recorded the deed from the plaintiff as Conservator of his father’s estate to his brother but, without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, did not record the reciprocal deed from the brother to the plaintiff as proposed in Attorney Kraner’s plan to deplete the estate assets and qualify the father for Title XIX benefits.

Attorney Kraner retained the unrecorded deed from the disabled brother to the plaintiff in his office. At some point in time following the execution of the two deeds, without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent, Attorney Kraner caused the deed to be “ripped up” and its destruction was not disclosed to the plaintiff until Attorney Kraner’s deposition was taken on May 2, 2006.

Attorney Kraner, in the interim, told the plaintiff that the deed he held could not be recorded until his father died. The plaintiff contacted the defendant Kraner on November 10, 2004 to report that his father had died and inquired whether the deed could now be recorded. Attorney Kraner stated that it could, but failed to disclose that he caused the executed deed to be destroyed. When the plaintiff followed up with telephone inquiries about the recordation of the deed, Attorney Kraner refused to respond to plaintiff’s calls.

The plaintiff’s brother subsequently sold the home in which the plaintiff and his family were residing and moved to California, taking with him all of the assets transferred from the father’s estate.

The original “ripped up” deed was introduced as an exhibit in the trial. One of the defenses raised by the defendants, which the jury apparently did not believe, was that the brother, after executing the deed to the plaintiff on October 26, 2000 closing, did not make “delivery” of the instrument and, thus, the transfer was never perfected.

Both Attorney Kraner and Attorney Bickford, claiming to be experts on elder law, testified that a transfer of the real estate by the disabled brother to the plaintiff on the same day that the real estate was transferred from the father’s estate to the disabled brother, was legal and not fraudulent. The jury believed their testimony and reasoned that the defendants violated their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages reflecting the value of the assets which the plaintiff would have received had the defendants’ estate plan been executed, as proposed.

One of the defenses which the defendants interposed and which was charged by the trial court (Aurigemma, J.), over the plaintiff’s objections, was that in order to prove that a fiduciary duty existed, the plaintiff had to prove that he actually paid attorney’s fees to the defendants from his personal funds. The defendants claimed that their attorney’s fees were paid from the father’s estate and thus no attorney/client relationship existed between the plaintiff individually and they owed no duty to the plaintiff.

It was disclosed during discovery that the defendants carried no professional liability insurance. An action is pending in Litchfield Superior Court against Attorney Kraner and his wife for the fraudulent conveyance of assets.

Submitted by Zbigniew S. Rozbicki, Esq., Torrington,

SETTLEMENT OF $800,000
Drunk Driver Crosses Into Oncoming Traffic and Forces a Head-on Collision

In the case of Tyler Ragone, Infant, by their g/a/l Gary Ragone v. Estate of Robert W. Clow, Jr. and Mary A. Clow, et al, the parties settled for $800,000.00 before having to file suit.

On July 29, 2005, the plaintiff, Tyler Ragone, was a 9-year-old, restrained rear-seat passenger in his father’s vehicle while traveling home on Route 7 in Brunswick, N.Y. The family was on their way home after vacation, when suddenly the defendant, Robert W. Clow, Jr., who was traveling from the opposite direction on Route 7, crossed into their lane of travel and hit another vehicle before slamming head-on into Tyler’s vehicle. The accident was devastating. Tyler and his family were all seriously injured and rushed to Albany Medical Center. The defendant driver, Robert W. Clow, Jr., was pronounced dead at the scene.

Tyler suffered a T12 fracture, grade IV liver laceration, grade I splenic laceration, small bowel perforation, abdominal bleeding, right hemithorax, pulmonary contusion, and bilateral 9th and 10th rib fractures. Tyler underwent emergency exploratory surgery to try and repair the internal organ damage. After the first surgery, Tyler’s condition continued to decline. He had a second surgery to remove 5” of his intestine. The surgeon placed five separate drains to try and relieve the pressure by allowing the blood and body fluids to drain out. Tyler later required a blood transfusion to compensate for his heavy loss of blood during and after the surgery.

On September 1, 2005, Tyler had to undergo a third surgery. An MRI revealed that Tyler’s T-12 vertebrae was not healing properly and would continue to get worse. Tyler underwent a T11/T12 fusion. The family was informed that given his age and the trauma he had undergone, it would be possible that he could experience complications later in life due to his growth. All of Tyler’s medical bills were covered by his health insurance, which did not assert a valid ERISA lien.

Remarkably, Tyler is now pain-free and without any permanency rating whatsoever. He spends his free time with his brother and father hiking, mountain biking and skiing. He has made a full recovery and has had no complications.

On August 31, 2007, the parties settled for $800,000.00.

Submitted by Robert L. Gould, Esq. of Carter Mario Injury Lawyers, Milford.
Report on E-Filing From the Judicial Branch
By Alice Harrington Mastrony, Executive Director's Office, State of Connecticut Judicial Branch

Editor's Note: This short article is an invaluable introduction to e-filing. Every office should have a copy at hand; you will use it every day.

In 2003, recognizing the potential of technology to facilitate the delivery of service and information to attorneys, litigants, the public, court staff and Judges, in a cost-effective and efficient manner, the Branch embarked upon a collaborative effort to design, build, and implement an electronic filing system by July 1, 2004. Part of the development and implementation of an electronic filing system was the development of an integrated case management and document management system to replace the legacy system that the Judicial Branch has had since the mid-1970s. In the ensuing five and a half years, the electronic filing system has been designed and built together with a substantial portion of the new case management and document management system.

Early in the development of the e-filing, a procedural decision was made to phase in the implementation of e-filing over the course of several years, retaining the paper file as the official file during this process. The phase-in process allowed attorneys and the Branch to adjust gradually to the changes that come with electronic filing and provided the Judicial Branch with the flexibility to modify the system in response to the feedback from users. In August, the few remaining civil case types became e-filable and the Judicial Branch is phasing in mandatory e-filing in all civil cases.

Beginning September 1st of this year, e-filing system became mandatory in all foreclosure cases, both existing e-filable foreclosure cases and all newly initiated foreclosure cases. Beginning December 5th, e-filing is mandatory in all remaining civil (CV) case types. Family (FA) cases are not e-filable. Case type exceptions to the mandatory e-filing requirement are:

- drug asset forfeitures;
- firearm safety hearing seizures;
- foreign civil judgments;
- foreign protective orders;
- habeas cases;
- proceedings for enforcement of municipal regulations and ordinances (JD-CV-20);
- summary process and housing civil matters; and
- vehicle forfeitures (pursuant to C.G.S. 22a-250 and 250a).

These case types cannot be e-filable.

In addition, cases that include a pre-judgment remedy, any transfers from small claims, and eminent domain cases (including state highway condemnation and redevelopment condemnation) cannot be initiated electronically, but subsequent motions, pleadings or documents are required to be filed electronically.

Although most motions, pleadings and documents in civil cases are required to be e-filed, certain exceptions to this requirement do exist. The items listed below cannot be filed electronically at this time. These items will continue to be filed on paper or by fax as they are now.

- Application for Order of Notice (pre-service)
- Application for Prejudgment Remedy (at case initiation or during a case)
- Application for Proceeds from a Tax Sale
- Application for Referral — Complex Litigation Docket (CLD) (This document must be filed with the Chief Administrative Judge.)
- Offer of judgment
- Original Committee Deed
- Proposed Judgment File
- Pseudonyms
- Foreclosure Return of Sale — with proceeds
- Lodged Records
- Motion for Protective Order (on behalf of non-appearing witness)
- Motion to Appear Amicus Curiae
- Motion to be Made a Party (defendant or plaintiff)
- Motion to Consolidate (filed by a non-party)
- Motion to Intervene
- Motion for Permission to Use Pseudonyms
- Motion to Quash (on behalf of non-appearing witness)
- Motion to Seal/Close/Limit Disclosure
- Motion to Substitute Party/Executor Disclosure
- Objection to Transfer to Complex Litigation Docket (CLD)
- Pseudonyms
- summary process and housing civil matters; and
- vehicle forfeitures (pursuant to C.G.S. 22a-250 and 250a).

With the implementation of mandatory e-filing in virtually all civil cases, the Branch is also transitioning from paper files to electronic files in the courthouses. For any civil case initiated with a return date on or after January 1, 2010, the official file will be the electronic file. From any judicial district courthouse, a person may access electronically viewable documents in cases throughout the state. Remote access from a home or office will continue to be limited to attorneys with an appearance in a file.

For additional information on e-filing or E-Services, please contact Attorney Janice Calvi Ruimerman at (860) 263-2734 Ext. 3038 or Attorney Alice Mastrony at (860) 706-5321.
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